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Scientific Study of Bureaucracy.

In doing so, we explicitly consider the extent to which organizational choices affect how accountable these organizations are to those delegating policy implementation to them. We analyze how regulatory organizations can be made to function either as independent entities or within broader governmental administrative organizations such as departments or ministries. Moreover, we explicitly consider the extent to which political appointment (or lack thereof) of the organization’s senior leadership drives regulatory activities, focus, and performance. We also study the related question of how various alternatives to financing a regulator’s budget affects its relationships with political policymakers, interest groups, and the public more generally. We then shift to consider the horizontal structure of a regulatory organization, examining the ways in which it is impacted by the breadth of assignments delegated to it by its political principals. We consider the various dimensions along which regulatory responsibilities can be combined with related missions and further show that how broadly or narrowly the regulatory organization or agency’s scope of responsibilities is defined can impact its decision-making and performance. Of particular importance are the effects of combining those missions that might directly conflict with the goals of the regulatory function. In this section, we also consider how * Recognizing that differences exist among them in practice, in this paper, we use the terms “ministry” and “department” interchangeably and also the terms “agency,” “commission,” and “bureau” interchangeably. Although all are responsible for the implementation of government policy (i.e. public administration), the latter group often resides within – but also may be separate and “independent” of – the former. We explicitly note in the text any cases where the insights are particular to one type of organization at either a ministry and department level or an agency, commission, and bureau grouping. 2 integrating missions as well as creating “stovepipes” or “silos” can serve to mitigate the unwanted effects of combining or separating various regulatory and non-regulatory missions. We further explain the effects on policy implementation when regulatory organizations are structured so that their regulatory jurisdictions overlap with each other.