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Political economy

In contrast, consider a potential aggressor, whose income increases from z to z0 , and look at the attacks perpetrated by him. Given the assumptions of our model, there is no ambiguity here at all: the opportunity cost of engaging in violence goes up, and aggression must decline. Formally, the inequality ð1Þ is less likely to hold for any aggressor-victim pair, and so—all other things being equal—the probability of attack, as given by ð2Þ, must come down. 12 Recall that w is linear in average incomes and is therefore bounded above by a fraction of Y if all incomes in society are smaller than Y. Moving Y down lowers w and must create a crossover to the human protection technology at some positive level even if w* 5 0. This level is sufficient for our needs ðit may be far from necessaryÞ. 13 By mixing across individuals who are indifferent between making this change, we can always make sure that the graph of the protection function is continuous, so that an equilibrium exists. 732 journal of political economy This content downloaded from on Tue, 9 Sep 2014 10:18:07 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions FIG. 3. —A change in group fortunes: high income. A, The defense response; B, equilibrium. In panel A, a victim’s optimal choice of defense shifts away from the human mode. In panel B, this leads to a sizable shift in both the attack and protection functions, so that the probability of attack changes in an ambiguous fashion. This content downloaded from on Tue, 9 Sep 2014 10:18:07 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions IV. Empirical Analysis A. Data Systematic statistical information on outbreaks of religious violence in India is relatively hard to come by, and our choice of time period is constrained by the available overlap of conflict data and economic information. On conflict, we use a data set compiled by Steven Wilkinson and Ashutosh Varshney. ðSee, in particular, the recent use of this data set in Wilkinson ½2004.Þ It summarizes reports from The Times of India, a leading national newspaper, on Hindu-Muslim conflicts in India in the second half of the twentieth century. This data set has information on deaths, injuries, and arrests. It does not provide hard information on which side initiated the violence, for in most cases that issue would necessarily be mired in subjectivity. For every report of Hindu-Muslim violence, the data set provides the date of incidence of the riot; the name of the city/town/village; the district and state; its duration; the number of people killed, injured, and arrested; and the reported proximate cause of the riot.